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Will the Israel-Iran ceasefire hold through 15 December 2026?

Resolution: Updated:

In short

The market currently leans toward the ceasefire holding, treating a breakdown as the less likely outcome but far from ruled out. The biggest reason is that more than a year has passed since the direct Israel-Iran air war without a qualifying strike resuming. A single confirmed Israeli or Iranian strike meeting the market's definition before 15 December 2026 would flip this to No immediately.

Editorial illustration for: Will the Israel-Iran ceasefire hold through 15 December 2026?

How the contract works

A contract on this question settles at $1 if the ceasefire survives without a qualifying strike through 15 December 2026, and at nothing if a qualifying strike occurs first. The price at any moment is the market's running estimate of that chance: a contract trading at 0.30, for example, would imply the market sees roughly a three-in-ten chance the ceasefire holds, not a near-certainty either way. Settlement is based on Polymarket's published rules, with the relevant cutoff set in Iran Standard Time. A position in this contract can typically be sold before the settlement date at whatever price the market is offering at that time, rather than held to resolution.
What the market thinks happens
$100
Yes74%

The event happens

Costs now
$0.74
If you put in $100
$135
No26%

The event does not happen

Costs now
$0.26
If you put in $100
$385

Probability

History starts collecting once the event is tracked

How the price has moved

The figures available describe the current state of the market rather than a documented move: a consensus of 79% built from $559,294 in volume concentrated on a single tracked venue, Polymarket. No day-over-day or week-over-week change figures are available here, so this should be read as where the market sits now rather than evidence of a recent swing in either direction. The absence of a reported cross-venue spread, because only one venue is listed, means there is no second independent price to check this estimate against.

Analysis

Context

In June 2025, Israel and Iran fought a direct, roughly two-week air war after years of proxy and shadow conflict. Israel struck Iranian nuclear and military sites; Iran retaliated with missile and drone barrages against Israeli cities; the United States briefly struck Iranian nuclear facilities before a ceasefire took hold. That truce has lasted well over a year, through periodic rhetorical escalation, regional proxy incidents and diplomatic friction, without a confirmed direct strike by either state on the other. The principal actors are the Israeli government and military, Iran's government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the United States, whose diplomatic and military posture in the region underwrites the arrangement. Iran's nuclear program, the status of its enrichment capacity, and the pace of rebuilding its air defenses and missile stockpiles since the 2025 war remain the most watched variables for whether the truce survives. This market asks a narrow, binary question: does a qualifying direct strike occur between Israel and Iran before 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time on 15 December 2026. It does not ask about proxy fighting in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen, intercepted munitions, or naval and cyber incidents, all of which are explicitly excluded from the definition.
The consensus figure across the tracked venue sits at 79%, with Polymarket carrying the full $559,294 in recorded volume. Because only one venue is listed here, there is no cross-platform spread to read for disagreement; the single number reflects where that order book has settled rather than a convergence of independently priced markets. A volume figure in the hundreds of thousands of dollars on a single-resolution geopolitical contract is modest by the standards of major election or macro markets, which suggests a smaller, more specialized pool of participants pricing this specific war-risk question rather than broad retail interest. The structural case behind a price in the high 70s rests on duration: the ceasefire has already outlasted its first and most dangerous months, the period immediately after the 2025 war when retaliatory strikes were most likely. Each additional month without a qualifying strike is itself evidence, because it means neither government has judged a resumption worth the cost, even through several rounds of regional friction. That is the kind of base-rate argument markets tend to price in: survival to date is not a guarantee of survival to 15 December 2026, but it narrows the remaining window in which a reignition has to happen. What keeps the price short of near-certainty is the unresolved status of Iran's nuclear program and its military reconstitution. Israel's 2025 strikes targeted nuclear and missile infrastructure specifically because Israeli officials judged Iran's progress unacceptable; if inspections or intelligence assessments indicate Iran has rebuilt enrichment capacity or missile stocks to a similar threshold, the same logic that produced the 2025 war could produce another strike before year-end. Iran, for its part, has strong incentive to avoid provoking a renewed Israeli campaign while its air defenses remain degraded, which cuts toward restraint on its side specifically. The narrow definition of a qualifying event also matters for how the price should be read. Proxy attacks by Iran-aligned groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen, interceptions, naval incidents and cyber operations do not resolve this market No on their own. That makes the contract more a bet on state-to-state escalation specifically than on regional calm broadly, and it is one reason the price can sit comfortably above the halfway mark even in a region that remains tense.

What moves the probability

  1. Time since the 2025 war

    Each month without a qualifying strike since the June 2025 air war is evidence against a near-term resumption, because it means both governments have repeatedly chosen not to escalate. This pushes the price toward Yes, though it caps out short of certainty because the underlying disputes are unresolved, not settled.

  2. Iran's nuclear and missile reconstitution

    If intelligence or inspection reporting indicates Iran has rebuilt enrichment capacity or missile stockpiles toward pre-2025 levels, that is the single most direct trigger for another Israeli strike. This is the main driver pushing against a Yes resolution and the one most likely to move the price sharply if new reporting emerges.

  3. US diplomatic and military posture

    Continued US engagement in the region, including military presence and diplomatic pressure on both sides, has underwritten the truce so far. A reduction in US attention or a shift in US policy toward either government would reduce one of the main restraints keeping both sides from acting.

  4. Proxy activity that falls short of the market's definition

    Attacks by Iran-aligned groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen, or naval and cyber incidents, do not count as qualifying events under the resolution rules even if they raise regional tension. This keeps the contract's price more stable than raw headline risk might suggest, because much of the regional friction reported in the news does not move this specific market.

The case for

  • The ceasefire has already held for well over a year since the June 2025 war without a confirmed direct strike by either state on the other.
  • Iran has strong incentive to avoid provoking renewed Israeli strikes while its air defenses and missile stocks remain below pre-2025 levels.
  • Continued US diplomatic and military engagement in the region gives both governments an external restraint against unilateral escalation.
  • The market's narrow definition excludes proxy attacks, interceptions and naval or cyber incidents, meaning regional friction short of a direct state strike does not break the ceasefire for resolution purposes.

The case against

  • Iran's underlying nuclear program, the original trigger for the 2025 war, remains unresolved and any reported rebuilding of enrichment capacity could prompt a fresh Israeli strike before 15 December 2026.
  • Israel has already demonstrated willingness to strike preemptively on intelligence assessments rather than waiting for an attack, which shortens the warning time before a qualifying event.
  • A proxy attack or naval incident, even though excluded from the market's definition, could still spiral into a direct state-to-state exchange that does qualify.
  • Roughly five weeks remain before the settlement date, which is still enough time for a single strike to flip the outcome regardless of how long calm has already lasted.

What to watch

The resolution date is 15 December 2026, with the cutoff set at 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time; the market itself settles on 16 December 2026. Between now and then, the key triggers to watch are any new IAEA reporting on Iranian enrichment levels, public statements from the Israeli security cabinet or IRGC leadership signaling intent to strike, any escalation involving Iran-aligned proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen that could draw in state forces directly, and any shift in US military posture or diplomatic engagement in the region.

Trade this contract

Venues (1)

Open on PolymarketYes 0.74
  • gas covered
  • no trading fee

More about this event

Venues (1)

Probability

  • Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through November 22?94%
  • Israel x Iran ceasefire continues through December 15?74%

Resolution rules

Determined by
Polymarket (Israel x Iran ceasefire markets)
Resolution date

The market resolves Yes if no direct air strike or surface-to-surface missile strike occurs between Israel and Iran before 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time on 15 December 2026. Qualifying actions include bombs, air-to-surface missiles, air-launched drones, one-way attack drones, and cruise or ballistic missiles fired directly by one state at the other. Intercepted munitions, surface-to-air missile fire, small-arms fire, ground incursions, cyber operations, naval gunfire or artillery, and minor short-range strikes do not count; if any such qualifying strike occurs, the market resolves No, and Polymarket is the source determining resolution.

Calculation methodology โ†’

Local context

US policy and military posture in the region are directly tied to whether this ceasefire holds, making this one of the clearer foreign-policy flashpoints for American readers specifically, through the question of continued US military presence, diplomatic commitments and the risk of US forces being drawn into any renewed exchange. For readers in the UK, Canada, Australia and India, the connection runs mainly through oil markets and shipping routes: a resumption of direct Israel-Iran strikes carries meaningful risk to Gulf energy infrastructure and Strait of Hormuz shipping, which would show up in fuel prices and freight costs well beyond the region itself.

Common questions

What exactly settles this market, and when?
Polymarket settles the market based on whether a qualifying direct strike between Israel and Iran occurred before 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time on 15 December 2026. The market itself resolves on 16 December 2026, after that cutoff has passed.
What does a price of roughly 79% actually mean?
It means market participants are collectively pricing the ceasefire's survival at about four-to-one in favor, not that the outcome is certain. The price moves as new information arrives and reflects what buyers and sellers are currently willing to pay, not a forecast guaranteed to be correct.
What counts as a strike that breaks the ceasefire for this market?
Only a direct air strike, such as bombs, air-to-surface missiles or air-launched drones, or a surface-to-surface missile strike, including one-way attack drones, cruise or ballistic missiles, by Israel against Iran or Iran against Israel. Proxy attacks, interceptions, small-arms fire, ground incursions, cyber operations and naval gunfire do not qualify.
What happens if there's an ambiguous incident, like an intercepted missile or a disputed claim of responsibility?
The resolution rules specifically exclude intercepted munitions and surface-to-air missile fire from counting as a qualifying strike. If responsibility for an incident is disputed or unclear, the market would need a confirmed direct strike meeting the stated definition before it resolves No.
Has the ceasefire come close to breaking before?
The ceasefire has faced periods of heightened rhetoric and regional proxy activity since it took hold in mid-2025, but no confirmed direct state-to-state strike meeting this market's definition has been reported in that time.
Why is trading volume on this market relatively modest?
At $559,294 on the tracked venue, this is a smaller market than major election or macro contracts, suggesting a narrower pool of participants specifically pricing Israel-Iran escalation risk rather than broad retail attention.

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