Will Donald Trump win the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize?

The consensus across venues sits at 1%, and the spread between the highest and lowest venue is 1.3 percentage points — which in practice means one contract quoted at the floor and the others a point above it. That is not disagreement. It is the rounding noise you get when a market has decided an outcome is close to impossible and the remaining price is the cost of keeping the contract quotable. Total volume across the seven contracts listed is $7,494,892, with the largest single book at $1,432,041, so this is not a thin or neglected market: substantial money has looked at the question and reached the same conclusion at every venue. The base rate does most of the work. The Norwegian Nobel Committee receives several hundred valid nominations each year and gives one prize. Even a genuinely prominent candidate with multiple nominators is competing against a field the public never sees, because the nomination list is sealed for half a century. Markets on named individuals in this field therefore start near zero by construction and only rise when a specific, dated, verifiable achievement attaches itself to one name — the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the Iran nuclear negotiations, the Ethiopia–Eritrea peace deal in 2018. Absent that, the honest prior for any single named person is low single digits at best. The committee's own recent record cuts the same way. Machado in 2025, and before that a pattern of awards to journalists, disarmament campaigners and civil-society organisations, points to a body that prefers to reward people who have paid a personal cost for democratic or humanitarian work rather than serving heads of government conducting statecraft. Sitting leaders are the hardest category for this committee: the Obama award in 2009 became the standing cautionary example inside Norwegian commentary, and the members appointed by the Storting since then have shown no appetite to repeat it. Netanyahu, Putin and Xi carry additional obvious obstacles given ongoing conflicts and international legal proceedings. Timing matters for how these prices are likely to behave between now and October. Nominations closed on 31 January 2026, so no diplomatic breakthrough after that date can put a new name on the list — though the committee has the power to add its own candidates at its first meeting, and events after the deadline can certainly change how it ranks names already before it. Deliberations run through the spring and summer, with the decision typically settled at a meeting shortly before the announcement. That leaves a long stretch with no scheduled information, which is why the field has stayed pinned. The realistic path to a repricing is narrow: a signed and holding ceasefire or peace framework in Ukraine or Gaza, publicly credited to one identifiable person, in the weeks before early October. Short of that, the market's read is that the announcement on 9 October will name someone the candidate contracts do not cover, and the 'Other' outcome absorbs the probability.