How the contract works
A contract on this market settles at $1 if no qualifying military action, defined as an air strike or surface-to-surface missile strike that directly impacts the other country, is carried out by either Israel or Iran against the other before 30 November 2026, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time. It settles at nothing if either side conducts such a strike before that deadline. Intercepted munitions, small-arms fire, ground incursions, cyberattacks, naval fire and minor short-range strikes are explicitly excluded and do not trigger a No resolution. A price of, for example, 0.30 would mean the market judges the ceasefire likely to break roughly three times in ten before the deadline; it does not mean anything more specific than that. Positions can generally be sold before settlement at whatever price the market has moved to by then.
Yes72%
No28%
Probability
How the price has moved
The available data for this market covers only the current level, 72% on Polymarket, and total volume of $268,205 concentrated on that single venue. No historical range or day-over-week movement figures are available to describe here, so it is not possible to say whether the price has been rising, falling or flat, or to attribute any move to a specific event. What can be said is that the current level reflects a market that judges the ceasefire more likely than not to hold, but with a meaningful, not negligible, chance of breaking before the deadline.
Analysis
Context
The ceasefire in question followed a 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, during which Israel struck Iranian military and nuclear-linked sites and the United States carried out strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. A truce took hold after those strikes, halting direct exchanges between the two countries. Since then, the question has been whether that truce survives, or whether either side resumes direct military action against the other.
The stakes are regional and global at once. Iran's nuclear program, its network of allied militias across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and Israel's stated willingness to strike preemptively all remain live variables. Any resumption of direct strikes would not stay contained to the two countries: it would draw in US military assets already positioned in the region and test Washington's diplomatic investment in the ceasefire it helped broker.
This market asks a narrow, falsifiable question: does either country conduct a qualifying strike on the other before the clock runs out on 30 November 2026. It does not ask whether tensions ease, only whether the shooting stops.
The market-implied probability sits at 72% on Polymarket, the only venue currently tracked, on total volume of $268,205. That volume is modest by the standards of major geopolitical markets, which tells its own story: this is a closely watched but not heavily traded question, and the price reflects the judgment of a relatively small pool of participants rather than a deep, liquid consensus. A single-venue price with no cross-venue spread to check it against should be read with that caveat in mind.
The substantive case behind 72% rests on the record since the June 2025 ceasefire took effect. Neither Israel nor Iran has conducted a qualifying direct strike on the other's territory in the months since, despite periodic rhetoric from officials on both sides. That track record matters because it is the single clearest piece of evidence the market has to price against: a ceasefire that has already survived several months of tension is judged more likely to survive the remaining weeks to 30 November than one that had just been announced.
The more consequential unresolved variable is Iran's nuclear program. The June 2025 strikes targeted Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan specifically because of Israeli and US assessments of Iran's enrichment capacity. Any credible reporting that Iran is rebuilding that capacity, whether through IAEA inspection reports or intelligence disclosures, would be the most likely trigger for a preemptive Israeli strike, and the market would be expected to move sharply on such news. Conversely, continued IAEA access and no evidence of reconstitution reinforces the current pricing.
A second variable is proxy activity. Attacks by Hezbollah, Houthi forces or Iranian-aligned militias in Iraq and Syria do not by themselves resolve this market No, since it requires a direct strike by Israel or Iran on the other's territory. But a proxy attack severe enough to provoke an Israeli response aimed at Iran directly, or an Iranian response to an Israeli strike on a proxy, is the plausible pathway by which an indirect incident becomes a qualifying direct one.
What moves the probability
Iranian nuclear activity
Any confirmed resumption of high-level enrichment at Fordow or Natanz, reported by the IAEA or independent intelligence, would be the strongest single trigger for renewed Israeli strikes and would push the probability of a holding ceasefire down. Continued IAEA access without such findings supports the current pricing.
US diplomatic and military posture
Washington brokered the June 2025 ceasefire and has military assets stationed in the region that would likely be drawn into any renewed conflict. Sustained US pressure on both governments to avoid escalation is a meaningful stabilizing force behind the current price.
Proxy escalation risk
Attacks by Hezbollah, Houthi forces or Iranian-aligned militias do not themselves resolve this market, but a severe enough incident could provoke a direct Israeli or Iranian response that does qualify. This is the most plausible indirect pathway to a No resolution.
Domestic political pressure
Hardline factions within both Israel and Iran have periodically called for renewed action since June 2025. Their influence on either government's calculus is difficult to observe directly but represents a persistent downside risk to the ceasefire holding.
The case for
- No qualifying strike by either Israel or Iran on the other's territory has occurred since the June 2025 ceasefire took effect.
- The United States has an active diplomatic and military stake in the truce it helped broker and continues to press both sides to avoid escalation.
- Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure was significantly degraded by the June 2025 strikes, reducing its near-term capacity and incentive to provoke renewed conflict.
- Continued IAEA access to Iranian nuclear sites without evidence of rapid reconstitution removes the most likely trigger for a preemptive Israeli strike.
The case against
- Iran retains the stated intent to rebuild its nuclear program, and any confirmed resumption of enrichment could prompt Israel to strike again before 30 November 2026.
- Proxy forces aligned with Iran, including Hezbollah and Houthi fighters, remain active and could provoke an Israeli response that escalates into a direct strike on Iranian territory.
- Hardline political factions in both Israel and Iran have called publicly for renewed military action since the ceasefire began.
- A ceasefire that has held for several months can still break in its final weeks, and the deadline itself, 30 November 2026, gives both sides a defined window in which any planned action would resolve the market No.
What to watch
Watch for IAEA reporting on Iranian enrichment activity, which is the most direct proxy for whether Iran is rebuilding the capacity that triggered the June 2025 strikes. Watch for any statements from Israeli officials about preemptive action, and for any escalation involving Hezbollah or Houthi forces that could draw a direct Israeli or Iranian response. The market resolves on 30 November 2026, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time, so the final weeks of that window carry disproportionate weight for any last-minute strike.
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