How the contract works
A contract on this question settles at $1 if no qualifying military action, defined as an air strike or surface-to-surface missile strike, including drones, cruise or ballistic missiles, directly hitting the other country, occurs before 31 October 2026. It settles at nothing if such a strike happens. Interceptions, small-arms fire, ground incursions, cyber operations, naval gunfire, artillery and minor short-range strikes do not count as breaking the ceasefire under these rules. A price of 0.30, for example, would mean the market judges the ceasefire roughly three chances in ten to survive to the deadline; a position in either direction can typically be sold before settlement at whatever the price is at that time. A related market applies the same test to a later deadline of 31 December 2026.
Yes76%
No24%
Probability
How the price has moved
The consensus reading stands at 76% on a single tracked venue, Polymarket, with total volume of $253,658 changing hands. Granular figures for movement over the past day or week are not available in the data behind this page, so no specific news event can be credited with moving the price recently; the honest reading is that the level has settled at a point clearly favoring the ceasefire holding without approaching near-certainty, consistent with a market that sees the truce as durable for now but not free of risk before the October deadline.
Analysis
Context
The ceasefire in question ended a 12-day direct military exchange between Israel and Iran in June 2025, during which Israel struck Iranian military and nuclear-linked sites and the United States carried out strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. The truce was brokered with heavy US involvement and has since been the baseline for the region: no acknowledged air strike or missile strike has passed directly between the two countries since it took effect. Iran's nuclear infrastructure, its regional proxies including Hezbollah and the Houthis, and Israel's stated red lines on enrichment all remain live variables that could push either side back toward direct confrontation before the market's 31 October 2026 deadline.
The consensus figure across tracked venues sits at 76%, drawn entirely from a single active venue, Polymarket, with total trading volume of $253,658. That volume is modest next to major US political or macro markets, which means the price here is more exposed to being shifted by a handful of larger trades than a deeper, more liquid contract would be. There is no second venue to compare against, so there is no cross-market spread to read for disagreement; the number reflects one pool of traders rather than a broad consensus assembled across platforms. Detailed day-over-day or week-over-week movement figures are not available in the data behind this page, so no specific short-term trigger can be attributed to recent pricing; what can be said is that the level has settled well above the midpoint, indicating traders see the truce as more likely to hold than not, without treating it as close to certain. The structural argument behind that number is straightforward: both Israel and Iran absorbed real costs in the June 2025 exchange, and neither government has publicly signalled intent to reopen direct strikes absent a new provocation. What keeps the figure short of a near-certain reading is the unresolved status of Iran's nuclear program. If new intelligence or IAEA reporting suggested Iran was rebuilding enrichment capacity destroyed or degraded in 2025, Israel has repeatedly signalled it would treat that as grounds for renewed strikes, and that scenario is the most direct path to a Yes-breaking event before 31 October 2026.
What moves the probability
Status of Iran's nuclear program
Any credible report, from the IAEA or intelligence leaks, that Iran is rebuilding enrichment capacity at Fordow, Natanz or elsewhere would sharply raise the odds of an Israeli strike, since Israel has treated this as its core red line. This is the single largest swing factor for the remainder of the market's life.
Proxy attacks attributed to Iran
An attack by Hezbollah or the Houthis that Israel or the United States formally attributes to Iranian direction could draw a direct Israeli response against Iranian territory, which would count as breaking the ceasefire under these rules. This channel matters because it does not require a decision by Tehran itself to trigger a qualifying strike.
US posture and involvement
Continued US military and diplomatic backing for Israel, including the possibility of further US strikes on Iranian facilities, shapes Iran's calculus on whether retaliation is worth the cost. A change in US administration posture toward either restraint or escalation would move this probability meaningfully.
Iranian domestic political stability
A regime under greater internal pressure may be less willing to risk a war it cannot sustain militarily after the losses of June 2025, which tends to support the ceasefire holding. Conversely, a leadership seeking to project strength domestically could take greater risks.
The case for
- No qualifying strike, as defined by the settlement rules, has been carried out by either side since the June 2025 truce took effect.
- Iran's military capacity was substantially degraded during the 12-day war, reducing its near-term ability to sustain renewed direct conflict with Israel.
- The ceasefire carries continued US backing, which raises the diplomatic and military cost for either side of being the party seen to break it.
- Both governments have institutional incentives to avoid reopening a conflict that produced heavy costs for each in 2025.
The case against
- Iran could resume or be found to have resumed uranium enrichment activity before 31 October 2026, which Israel has indicated would justify renewed strikes.
- An attack by Hezbollah, the Houthis or another Iran-aligned group could be attributed to Tehran and prompt a direct Israeli response that qualifies as breaking the truce.
- Regional ceasefires in this conflict have historically proven short-lived, and the 31 October 2026 deadline still leaves two months of exposure.
- A change in Israeli or US government posture, including new intelligence assessments, could shift the calculus toward preemptive action before the deadline.
What to watch
Key events to track include any IAEA statements on Iranian enrichment activity, Israeli government statements on red lines regarding Iran's nuclear program, reports of strikes by or against Hezbollah or the Houthis that get attributed to Iranian direction, and any shift in US administration statements on further strikes or diplomatic guarantees. The related market tracking the ceasefire through 31 December 2026 is also worth watching, since a widening or narrowing gap between the two deadlines would signal how traders view risk concentrated in the final months of 2026 versus risk spread further out.
Trade this contract
Open on Polymarket
- gas covered
- no trading fee